Integration, Community, and the Medical Model of Social Injustice

ALEX MADVA

ABSTRACT I defend an empirically-oriented approach to the analysis and remediation of social injustice. My springboard for this argument is a debate – principally represented here between Tommie Shelby and Elizabeth Anderson, but with much deeper historical roots and many flowering branches – about whether racial-justice advocacy should prioritise integration (bringing different groups together) or community development (building wealth and political power within the black community). Although I incline toward something closer to Shelby’s ‘egalitarian pluralist’ approach over Anderson’s single-minded emphasis on integration, many of Shelby’s criticisms of integrationism are misguided, and his handling of the empirical literature is profoundly unbalanced. In fact, while both Shelby and Anderson defend the importance of social science to their projects, I’ll argue that each takes a decidedly unempirical approach, which ultimately obscures the full extent of our ignorance about what we can and ought to do going forward. A more authentically empirical tack would be more epistemically humble, more holistic, and less organised around what I’ll call prematurely formulated ‘Grand Unified Theories of Social Change’. I defend a more ‘diversified experimentalist’ approach, which rigorously tests an array of smaller-scale interventions before trying to replicate and scale up the most promising results.

Introduction

Tommie Shelby argues that leading proposals for addressing racial injustice in the US, especially as they relate to black people living in ghetto poverty, suffer from a technocratic and medicalised approach.¹ This approach fails both to respect the agency of the ghetto poor and to question the basic structures maintaining the unjust status quo. Shelby targets, in particular, what he calls ‘new integrationism’, whose defenders are said to include Michelle Adams, Elizabeth Anderson, Sheryll Cashin, Owen Fiss, and Orlando Patterson.² Integrationists argue that racial-justice advocacy should prioritise bringing members of different groups together – to live in the same neighbourhoods, learn and teach in the same schools, collaborate in the same businesses and political processes, and so on. Shelby is not opposed to integration per se. He is opposed, given current conditions, to prioritising coercive and paternalistic integrationist initiatives over community development, i.e. over investments in the disadvantaged areas where people already live. The nub of Shelby’s criticism, which builds on the black-nationalist tradition, is that the ghetto poor are persistently denied the rights, resources, and opportunities that all citizens deserve, and it is unjust to make receipt of these basic deserts contingent upon their willingness to move out of predominantly black
neighbourhoods and into integrated (but predominantly white) ones. According to Shelby, integrationists are effectively telling ghetto residents that getting reliable access to decent healthcare, education, jobs, and so on, requires uprooting their households, leaving behind their social networks, moving away from services that cater to their distinctive needs and preferences (hair salons, religious centres, etc.), and putting up with hostility from their new white neighbours.

Shelby instead defends ‘egalitarian pluralism’, which lies between all-out black separatism and all-in integrationism.\(^3\) Pluralism acknowledges that white self-segregation is wrong, and advocates combatting it by, e.g., enforcing laws against housing discrimination and dismantling restrictive-zoning regulations that prevent multifamily units from being built in wealthy suburbs. But pluralism does not abandon ghetto residents who prefer to stay put. It insists on transferring resources to the ghetto itself, giving its residents fair options about where to live, learn, and work, and guaranteeing all citizens their basic deserts, wherever they call home. Pluralism thus neither prescribes nor prescribes black self-segregation. Pluralism also insists that the ghetto poor have the opportunity to be genuine participants in collective decisions about policy and distribution, rather than just being coerced or nudged around by elitist technocrats.

There is much to recommend egalitarian pluralism. Shelby does a great service in stressing the rationality, rights, and political agency of the oppressed. I agree that we owe the ghetto poor better options. However, Shelby’s arguments against integrationism and for pluralism are, at best, underdeveloped. He disregards some of the most powerful points in integration’s favour, and his gestures toward community-development alternatives are normatively and empirically vague to a degree that renders them difficult to evaluate. Although Anderson and others overstate the case for integration, it remains a highly plausible hypothesis that at least some ‘affirmative’ integrationist steps are necessary for meaningful, lasting progress. Integration may provide key benefits to racial justice unlikely to be promoted via other means, and there may be ways to promote integration that avoid, or mitigate, Shelby’s objections. It cannot be overemphasised, however, that the empirical jury is still out. Any fair-minded surveyor of the evidence would be less confident than either Shelby or Anderson is in asserting what will or will not work, and more cautious about recommending concretely what we ought and ought not to do. This overconfidence is striking given that both Shelby and Anderson claim that careful attention to social science has a role to play in informing philosophical reflection about racial justice. For example, Shelby writes, ‘Social scientific research will therefore be essential to ensuring that our moral assessments are suitably informed by the relevant facts. In addition, it is important to recognise the possibility that these facts, as with all scientific facts, may diverge from or conflict with common sense, prompting us to revise our pre-conceptions’.\(^4\) Yet, I’ll argue, neither Shelby nor Anderson weighs the empirical evidence appropriately.

I’ll first summarise Shelby’s methodological critique of integrationists, which is that they adopt a ‘medical model’ that wrongly puts empirical investigation and experimentation before moral-political reflection (Section 1). I’ll then explain how empirically-oriented racial-justice advocates can avoid Shelby’s objections (Section 2), and how both integrationists (Section 3) and pluralists (Section 4) make misleading appeals to evidence. I’ll nevertheless offer tentative grounds for thinking that at least some proactive integrationist steps are in order (Section 5), and that Shelby’s vision of how to prioritise moral dialogue over empirical investigation is unpromising (Section 6).
I conclude by highlighting one of Anderson and Shelby’s shared oversights, regarding the necessity of individual prejudice reduction to any candidate racial-justice initiative (Section 7).

1. The Medical Model and its Alleged Adherents

Shelby argues that new integrationism exemplifies the ‘the medical model of social problem solving’, conceiving of injustices as akin to clinical diseases for science to cure:

\[\ldots\] the persistent cries of injustice and other grievances of members of society are conceived as symptoms (like headaches, fatigue, and insomnia) to be treated by empirically grounded interventions, which are conceived as potential cures for social ills. The justice doctor, concerned about the health of the polity, attempts to discover the ‘underlying causes of the complaints’ (p. 4), which may differ, perhaps radically, from what those who initially raised the complaints believe is the proper diagnosis. After careful empirical analysis and social experiments, the linchpin of the social problem is identified and actions are taken to remove it, with the hope that the troubling symptoms eventually fade away and the patient is healed.\(^6\)

The main drawbacks of the medical model are twofold. The first is status quo bias. The medical model’s practitioners aim to make ‘narrowly targeted’ interventions, which ‘treat the background structure of society as given … attempting to integrate [the ghetto poor] into an existing social system rather than viewing their unwillingness to fully cooperate as a sign that the system itself needs fundamental reform’.\(^7\) Instead of interpreting black resistance to proposed reforms as a rational response to unfair terms, and instead of seeking out deeper change, the medical model directs blacks to assimilate socially and economically into the white mainstream. The second, related drawback is ‘downgrading’ the agency of the oppressed, by pathologising their preferences, paternalistically structuring their options, and treating them as ‘passive victims in need of assistance rather than as potential allies in what should be a collective effort to secure justice for all’.\(^8\)

Shelby’s insistence on respecting the rights and rationality of the ghetto poor is well-taken, as is his conviction that we must train our focus on underlying injustices. The so-called medical model is, however, not a model at all, but a mélange of conceptually distinct and at most contingently interconnected features. These features are, furthermore, at most contingently connected to integrationism (and, for that matter, also historically connected to black nationalism and numerous past and present community-development initiatives). Saddling integrationists with the medical model generates numerous false contrasts and equivocations, and obfuscates more than it illuminates.

For starters, when one drills into new integrationists’ substantive views, it is apparent that they hardly form a unified bloc, and the boundaries between some of their views and pluralism are quite blurry. Lumping these thinkers together glosses over substantive policy differences, most glaringly with respect to whether integration must be race-conscious (explicitly bringing different racial groups together, as Anderson, Adams, Patterson, and john a. powell advocate) or merely economic (e.g. creating
mixed-income neighbourhoods and schools, as Fiss and Cashin propose, perhaps on the understanding that, because race and class overlap, facially race-neutral economic integration will indirectly promote racial integration as well). Although Shelby acknowledges this distinction, he does not track it consistently. In particular, he cites the disappointing results of mixed-income (colour-blind) housing studies as if they were direct evidence for the dim prospects of race-conscious integration, too. Relatively, integrationists may also disagree over precisely which arenas to prioritise integrating, and how. Anderson defends concrete proposals for integrating all spheres of American life (neighbourhoods, schools, businesses, electoral districts, police departments, juries), but it is open to integrationists to concede (as they should; Section 3) that the evidence for proactively integrating neighbourhoods is weaker than that for integrating school and work.

My point here is not that these thinkers cannot be lumped together for some purposes, but that they should not be lumped together for Shelby’s purposes. By comparison, Shelby elsewhere carefully distinguishes between forms of black nationalism and pluralism (radical, moderate, and conservative; elitist and anti-elitist; classical calls for a black nation-state versus pragmatic calls to rally against shared oppression; etc.), and ultimately defends one specific member in this family of views. Just so, some integrationists’ failures to respect ghetto agency should not be held against others, and so not held against integrationism in general. It’s even unclear why Shelby categorises all these thinkers as medical-modelling integrationists rather than pluralists. Sheryll Cashin literally endorses integrationist housing vouchers to facilitate movement out of the ghetto in one paragraph, and then tax incentives to support ghetto homeownership in the next. The latter is a paradigmatic strategy for directing resources to the disadvantaged, and perhaps to promote urban community development. Why, then, is Cashin not an agency-respecting pluralist rather than a ghetto-pathologising integrationist? After all, Roy Brooks, identified by Shelby as an exemplary pluralist, also supports a mix of community-development and integrationist proposals, at least with respect to education (if not housing). Both Cashin and Brooks explicitly prioritise giving the ghetto poor better options. Moreover, most integrationists would endorse the concrete redistributive proposals that Shelby peppers throughout Dark Ghettos, such as, when discussing the political ethics of parenting, ‘universal preschool, generous maternity leave, professional childcare services, [and] free birth control’.

There is, moreover, nothing inherent to black nationalism, pluralism, or other defences of black community development to preclude the medical model’s pitfalls. As Shelby explores in earlier work, there has historically been no shortage of elitist black intellectuals who both opposed assimilation to the white mainstream and pathologised disadvantaged blacks, or who thought that the primary path toward community uplift went through respectability and individualistic entrepreneurial grit, rather than through radical redistributions and restructurings of American society. The problem is elitism as such, and elitism comes in nearly every colour of the political spectrum.

Many community-development initiatives have been highly capitalistic and paternalistic, driven by elitist bureaucrats and predatory outside investors, without community input, in ways that disrespect ghetto agency and distract from underlying injustices. Of course, pluralists can (should) insist that those initiatives do not meet their criteria for fair community development, and thereby discount them. But so too can integrationists claim that many integrationist initiatives have failed to meet their criteria. The
problem, of course, is that all these initiatives have occurred within a massive and inordinately complex global system, and the financial investments have been miniscule in comparison to the flow of capital into some neighbourhoods and out of others. Strikingly, integrationists and pluralists alike complain of an evaluative double standard on this score, such that their proposals are expected to swiftly and singlehandedly bring about a just racial order, while their opponents’ efforts are allegedly measured against the more modest standard of providing specific benefits to individuals and families without necessarily transforming entire communities.\(^{17}\)

What, then, to make of Shelby’s criticism that integrationists fail to interrogate basic structure and injustice? Readers familiar with Anderson’s oeuvre might be surprised to discover that she is complacent about the status quo. This is, after all, a criticism she levels against those who think racial justice can and ought to be pursued without integration. Similarly, Adams and Powell argue that integration is radical – structure-transforming – and are at pains to distance ‘true integration’ from assimilationism.

Allegations of assimilationism and medicalisation might, however, be fairly raised against other integrationists. Although Shelby’s focus is on Anderson, the integrationist who most clearly exhibits these pitfalls is Orlando Patterson, who, for example, diagnoses single motherhood as the single greatest cause of black poverty.\(^{18}\) Such arguments cry out for a Shelby-style response: the ‘solution’ to that ‘problem’ is not for the state to educate or nudge black people to get married through individualistic, paternalistic ‘cultural’ reforms, but to collectively offer more resources to single parents (a claim which, again, many other integrationists would endorse). While Anderson also succumbs to moments of downgraded agency,\(^{19}\) her core argument is not that the ghetto poor are irrational or incapable of autonomy, but that segregation locks most of them in untenable conditions. Granted, large-scale integration, like any structural transformation, would have diverse, wide-ranging effects – including some movement toward interracial cultural conformity, but also a redistribution of resources and perhaps better-functioning democratic institutions (Section 5–6). Different theorists and activists can, therefore, defend integration for different reasons. Which changes are thought for the better and which for the worse will vary.

2. Defending the Empirical Mindset

Bracketing whether Shelby can make the charges against integrationists stick, one feature of the so-called medical model is worth preserving: an empirically rigorous, problem-solving orientation is necessary for the analysis and remediation of injustice. Call this the empirical mindset to distinguish it from the medical model’s putative pitfalls. The empirical mindset contrasts with aprioristic attempts to divine what justice requires by, e.g., consulting pure reason, or relying primarily on thought experiments about what we’d agree to if suddenly cast onto a desert island. One could cite numerous forebears for the empirical mindset. Consider, for example, Du Bois’ insistence that the challenge of how best to educate blacks and whites for ‘living together’ was ‘a matter of infinite experiment and frequent mistakes … We must not forget that most Americans answer all queries regarding the Negro a priori, and that the least that human courtesy can do is to listen to evidence’.\(^{20}\) In general contours, the empirical mindset aligns with Anderson’s experiment-in-living, nonideal-theoretic pragmatism,\(^{21}\)
although her defence of integration fails to live up to this vision (Section 3). I’ll say more about the empirical mindset in what follows.

What are Shelby’s grounds for yoking the empirical mindset to the pitfalls of the medical model? Does thinking of injustice analogously to a disease intrinsically entail disrespecting the oppressed and bowing to the status quo, or are the connections contingent? Shelby’s argument can be interpreted in two ways. The first is a conceptual argument, according to which the medical model is inherently demeaning or rights-violating. The second is (what I’ll call) an ideological argument, according to which the medical model is empirically connected (as cause, effect, or both) to disrespect for the poor and acquiescence to the status quo.

Some of Shelby’s objections to specific integrationist programs, especially housing vouchers which can only be used to move to integrated neighbourhoods, are naturally read as arguments of the conceptual stripe. That such vouchers restrict the ghetto poor’s choices, and disregard their reasonable preferences (e.g. to avoid discrimination and continue living near friends and family), are meant to be inherently wrong-making features of these programs.22 Similarly, Shelby believes the conditionality of such resource transfers is, just as such, objectionable. It is unfair to make the ghetto poor’s receipt of what we owe them conditional on their overhauling their lives.

Elsewhere, Shelby makes more modest, and more difficult to evaluate, claims about the apparently contingent and ideological connections between the pitfalls that ‘often attend’ the medical model.23 The idea seems to be that having an empirical, problem-solving orientation, and thinking of injustice as metaphorically similar to a disease, serves the ideological function of pathologising the disadvantaged, which in turn encourages seeing the status quo as just, or perhaps the empirical mindset arises from these ideological tendencies.

Yet neither style of argument poses an unsurmountable challenge. Suppose the intended connections are contingent. Why isn’t the upshot just to take extra care to pursue structure-overhauling, empirically grounded interventions without losing sight of the agency of the oppressed?24 Respecting those most affected and disadvantaged (for example, by facilitating their participation in decision-making processes or perhaps by making resource transfers to them unconditional) might be constraints on candidate interventions. Admittedly, many integrationists have failed to abide by such constraints, but so too have elitists of other persuasions. Indeed, numerous anti-empirical ideologues have also failed to respect ghetto agency, as have many black nationalists.25 Downgraded agency and status quo bias are pervasive problems (to which social scientists are not immune),26 but their distinctive causal connection to the empirical mindset is unclear.

Suppose instead that downgrading agency is meant to be an intrinsic feature of the empirical mindset – not avoidable with effort, but somehow constitutive of the mindset itself. To support this contention, Shelby might argue that empirically-oriented perspectives on human beings inherently downgrade their agency by appealing to the sort of distinction Strawson (among many other philosophers) makes between the ‘participant’ and ‘objective’ stances.27 Very roughly, Strawson describes two radically distinct ways of thinking about human beings, one as causally determined objects of science (subject, e.g., to medical diseases) and the other as responsible agents meriting praise or blame. If Shelby implicitly has an argument like this in mind, it cannot do the work he wants. It cannot explain why the empirical mindset downgrades only the agency of
the oppressed rather than of the privileged as well. An internally consistent empirical mindset would not see some adults as self-determining and others as passive products of external forces. In fact, social scientists across disciplines have long aimed to account for structure and agency, situation and personality, etc. If some empirically-oriented racial-justice advocates downgrade all and only the agency of the oppressed, they are not being empirical enough.

‘Medicalisation’ is, in fact, also a problem in medicine. Medical practitioners and researchers often disrespect the agency of patients and study participants, especially those low in social status, and downplay the role of social-environmental conditions in explaining medical disorders. But it would be absurd to conclude, on this basis, that empirically grounded interventions are given too central a role in medicine. To the contrary, medicalisation is (in addition to being disrespectful) bad science, which fails to take all relevant evidence into account (e.g. by discounting the testimony of patients, and focusing disproportionately on internal genes and traits, to the exclusion of contextual factors). Perhaps the most straightforward exemplification of this is in disability studies. Evidence demonstrates that many people with disabilities do not, simply in virtue of their disability, suffer reduced wellbeing, although they may suffer in virtue of stigma and exclusion from public spaces. Some aprioristically inclined and medicalising bioethicists adamantly dismiss this evidence, insisting that disabilities inherently make one worse off. But we must insist, with respect to some disabilities, on putting less emphasis on ‘cures’ and more emphasis on reconfiguring social meanings and tearing down barriers to accessibility. Note, however, that this still points to vitally important, partly empirical questions about how best to combat disability stigma and expand accessibility. There is no inconsistency in adopting an empirical mindset or using medical metaphors and thinking of the people implicated in those metaphors as full rational agents with all due respect and rights.

None of this general defence of the empirical mindset is a defence of integrationism per se. To the contrary, many integrationists stray from what the empirical mindset requires.

3. Unempirical Defences of Integration

The hoarding of resources and opportunities in white self-segregated spaces is, all parties to this dispute agree, a major driver of racial injustice. Some treat it as obvious that proactive integrationist policies are required in response. But pluralists are right that this inference is too quick. It is one thing to argue for resistance against the social and geographical exclusion of disadvantaged groups; it is another to argue that resistance requires coaxing people to move around and make new friends. Relatedly, even if integration is a legitimate aim, further questions arise about the most just and effective ways to pursue it. And on these points the evidence for existing integrationist initiatives is a messy, mixed, and sometimes disappointing bag.

One would not appreciate as much from reading the integrationists alone. Shelby is correct that Anderson overstates the decisiveness of the evidence – at least regarding housing vouchers. The evidence for integrated schooling, by contrast, is robust. Meta-analyses confirm that integrated schools ‘bring up’ the performance of poor and minority students without ‘bringing down’ wealthy whites; in fact, members of all
social groups demonstrably benefit in numerous ways (although benefits accrue, max-
imin-style, most to low-SES minority youth).29 Nevertheless, debates about residential integration continue to suck up much of the academic and activist oxygen, where evidence-based concerns fall into roughly two categories. The first regards what to glean from existing studies. The second is more historical, regarding how residential-integra-
tionist efforts have played out in the real world.

Vouchers figure prominently among proposals for facilitating movement out of the 
ghetto. The most extensively discussed programs are Gautreaux and Moving to Opportunity (MTO). Gautreaux was a court-ordered response to government-driven segregation in Chicago. Thousands of participants who moved to racially integrated suburban neighbourhoods fared better in education and employment than those who moved within the city. Gautreaux was, however, not a true experiment. Participation was entirely self-selected, and there was no control group. Nevertheless, on the basis of Gautreaux’s findings, the federal Department of Housing and Urban Development initiated MTO in five cities. MTO incorporated an experimental design that randomly assigned participants to one of three conditions: staying put in the public housing they were already in, receiving housing vouchers to move to any neighbourhood they liked, or receiving vouchers that could only be used to move to neighbourhoods low in pov-
erty. MTO’s results were significantly less encouraging. There were, in fact, no overall differences between the three experimental groups in terms of educational and employment outcomes.

As an apologist for the empirical mindset, the first point to make is that there have been very few rigorous, randomised-controlled studies akin to MTO. Even if Gau-
treaux and MTO had both utterly failed, or succeeded with flying colours, we could not on that basis draw strong conclusions either way about the broader prospects for housing vouchers, except insofar as the findings pointed toward specific do’s and don’ts for future housing-voucher experiments. Both studies were complex, with many up-for-grabs details of policy and implementation that could have been decided differ-
ently, in ways that either promoted or hindered success. (Consider, for example, fraught decisions about exactly which neighbourhoods to classify as ‘integrated’ or ‘low-poverty’.) Accordingly, the two studies differed in numerous ways, most signi-
ficantly in that Gautreaux was race-conscious and MTO was colour-blind and exclu-
sively socioeconomic. Moreover, these interventions were of necessity implemented in uncontrolled naturalistic settings, where all sorts of social, political, environmental, and urban-structural factors surely moderated their effects. It is overwhelmingly plau-
sible that, if integrationist housing vouchers work at all, they will work better in some places and times than others. There will, moreover, be better and worse modes of implementation, tailored to a variety of contextual specificities.30 Empirically speaking, we still do not know much about whether and when vouchers work.

Integrationists acknowledge that MTO delivered less than hoped for, but they cite a number of other potentially important benefits, such as improved mental health for adults and girls who moved to mixed-income areas. How much weight to place on such findings is unclear, especially looking at them under the harsh light of the ‘repli-
cation crisis’. MTO collected lots of data, which researchers have pored over repeat-
edly in the hunt for positive effects. Under such conditions, they were almost bound to uncover some statistically significant correlations. For example, a 2016 study found that young children who moved through MTO did ultimately tend to fare better in
educational achievement and income.\textsuperscript{31} This was publicised as an unqualified vindication of MTO, but this study again found that there were no economic benefits for those who moved as adults, and even a trend toward conditions being worse for children who moved after the age of thirteen.

Moreover, Edward Goetz argues that the range of empirical data collected in Gautreaux and MTO has been too narrow.\textsuperscript{32} (Goetz, a pluralist, provides an especially helpful and comprehensive survey of empirical, historical, and normative issues around the integration versus community-development debate, although he is focused exclusively on housing, which precludes a sufficiently comprehensive assessment of these competing visions of racial justice.) Researchers only examined the effects of moving on members of individual families, but not on the broader communities left behind or entered into. That is, the data collection has been highly individualistic, and does not explore the broader structural questions that Anderson and Adams make central to their defences of integration. There is certainly not sufficient evidence on residential integration to warrant their optimism about its structure-transforming power.

But the weightiest evidence against residential integrationism is the historical record. Goetz identifies an oft-repeated historical pattern,\textsuperscript{33} which goes, very roughly, as follows: 1) community-development groups propose to build, say, a multifamily affordable-housing complex in a ghetto; then 2) integrationists block the proposal because it will exacerbate concentrated racialised poverty, and demand that developers build in a wealthier, whiter area; but 3) none of the neighbourhoods that meet the integrationists’ conditions allow the complex to be built; and finally 4) it doesn’t get built at all, and the urgent need for safe, clean, affordable housing persists unmet. This pattern is deeply disconcerting, and versions of it are evident in housing-voucher studies as well: most Gautreaux and MTO participants were unable to use their vouchers, due to restrictive terms about where they could move, and white racism and high prices keeping them out of those spaces. And although the disappointing results of colour-blind MTO do not necessarily speak against the prospects of race-conscious initiatives, the historical record complicates this point as well. MTO was exclusively socioeconomic because that’s what was politically possible.\textsuperscript{34} Class-based initiatives reliably meet less resistance than race-conscious ones. Going forward, integrationists minimally owe us plausible proposals for how to navigate these forces of resistance, and evidence-based suggestions for how such programs might be improved.

Anderson’s response to these historical realities is inadequate. On her view, the fact that discrimination prevented participants from moving, and the fact that political opposition repeatedly waters down, or shuts down, integrationist efforts, suggest merely that these have not been true tests of integration – thereby explaining the disappointing results away.\textsuperscript{35} But a truly empirical response would treat discrimination and political opposition as full-blooded data points to incorporate into reflection about what to do. It is absurd to suggest that the most empirically defensible strategy is also a strategy that reams of historical evidence suggest won’t work. (I am not saying integration won’t work; minimally, it won’t work without being tailored to navigate antiblack racism and political feasibility).\textsuperscript{36}

Anderson’s response exemplifies two broader respects in which she fails to adopt a truly empirical mindset. The first is an insufficiently holistic and comprehensive model of the relevant social phenomena. She describes the harms of segregation and the benefits of integration, but does not adequately consider the causes of integration, or how
to navigate the harms and resistance that integrationist initiatives cause in turn (Section 7). The second respect in which Anderson’s approach is insufficiently empirical is her premature impulse toward the formulation of what we might call a ‘Grand Unified Theory’ of Social Structure and Change. Following Charles Tilly, she isolates segregation as unique and causally decisive (the ‘linchpin’ or ‘structural ground’) among all other potential drivers of group-based injustice and inequality. Her single-minded emphasis on segregation qua bedrock problem and integration qua master solution is reminiscent of an approach to social philosophy and science that we might associate with prominent intellectuals of the 19th and early 20th centuries, including Marx, Freud, Weber, etc., who drew on a small set of core concepts and organising first principles to understand large swaths of human life. To be clear, I definitively agree that theory-formation is essential to the empirical mindset, that scientific progress often involves unification of diverse areas of research, and that experimental interventions into social life should be partly theory-driven. But there are theories, and then there are (premature) Grand Unified Theories. The latter take a simple model that illuminates a narrow band of phenomena and ambitiously overextend it well beyond what the evidence licenses.

One might expect that the drive toward Grand Unified Theories would make one’s models more comprehensive rather than less (thereby mitigating what I said was the first unempirical aspect of Anderson’s approach). But just the opposite can occur. The unchecked impulse to subsume a wide and variegated range of phenomena under a simplistic theoretical roof can generate distortions, omissions, and post hoc rationalisations of unruly data points that do not fit easily into the picture. The hunt for foundational principles can lead to unwarranted assertions about the primary underlying causes of injustice and the only viable solutions, instead of acknowledging that contemporary injustice reflects a complicated web of holistically interconnected factors. My point here is directly related to one of Shelby’s criticisms of the medical model, which is the tendency to search for ‘linchpins’, for the single root problem around which everything else turns. Such searches may be encouraged by comparing social problems to medical conditions, when one underlying disease is thought to explain all the undesirable symptoms. Against Shelby, however, I would argue that linchpin-hunting is decidedly unempirical, at least when it comes to investigating complex, large-scale social phenomena.

How might we approach these questions in a less grand-theoretical, linchpin-focused way? Start by observing that an overwhelming percentage of randomised controlled trials, across all scientific spheres, produce null results. Moreover, many initially promising findings fail to replicate. So even if we grant that strategies promoting integration are preferable to those that do not, we should be reluctant to predict that any particular integrationist initiative will work, simply because most rigorously tested interventions of literally all kinds turn out to be ineffective upon close scrutiny. There is therefore little reason to think that tickets to get people out of the ghetto and into the suburbs are uniquely well-positioned to promote integration specifically or racial justice more generally. There is even less reason to think that some particular housing-voucher experiment in some particular context will be effective, or even generate terribly informative results.

In this vein, MTO itself arguably exemplifies the pitfalls of Grand Unified Theorizing (or Grand Social Experimentation). It put all the integrationist eggs in one
experimental basket. A more epistemically humble and context-sensitive approach would have invested first in an array of distinct, smaller-scale, randomised-controlled trials (perhaps informed by local community input). Subsequently, researchers would try to replicate, tweak, and gradually scale up the most auspicious results. We might call this bottom-up diversified experimentalism to contrast it with Grand Unified Theorizing. As Thomas Watson of IBM once said, ‘If you want to succeed, double your failure rate.’

Nevertheless, it cannot be forgotten that when one of these interventions fails, there are actual people in the ghetto who we are letting down. Too many live and die in poverty while empirical knowledge accumulates. It might then seem heartless and disrespectful to insist on rigorous experimentation into what will improve conditions. Why not skip the randomised-controlled trials and commit to investing in disadvantaged neighbourhoods? Unfortunately, many of the same cautionary tales apply equally well to community development. Proponents of community development, or other purportedly more ‘direct’ redistributive schemes, also succumb to Grand Unified Theorizing, and underestimate the extent of our ignorance about what we can and ought to do. Indeed, another symmetric accusation that pluralists and integrationists level against each other regards time scales. Each holds it against the other that suffering and injustice will continue before the benefits of some proposed intervention take full effect. I fear that both sides are right, and there is no getting around the need to assemble robust evidence about the best uses of our resources, especially when many well-meaning interventions have done nothing or made matters worse.

4. Unempirical Alternatives to Integration

Shelby’s case against integrationism rests on primarily normative grounds, but he cites a significant body of empirical research along the way. And his handling of the empirical questions is profoundly unbalanced. His cardinal error is equating the messy mixed-bag of evidence surrounding integration with the yawning absence of evidence he provides for his vaguely sketched alternative. Even granting all the legitimate normative (Section 1) and empirical (Section 3) challenges facing integration, it is, as Andrei Poama points out, not enough to highlight integration’s shortcomings to make an empirical case against it, nor to point out that, say, conditional resource transfers represent ‘a compromise with injustice’. One must also identify a reasonably effective alternative for delivering what we owe, which avoids comparable normative compromises. Shelby claims that egalitarian pluralism fits this bill. ‘If a suitable alternative is available that does not entail these costs but is compatible with justice, then blacks would be right to insist that we experiment with that one first. Egalitarian pluralism, I maintain, is that alternative’. So what is the substantive content of Shelby’s alternative, in what sense is this alternative ‘available’ to us, and what licenses his confidence that pursuing it will not incur equivalent normative compromises?

What little he says is sprinkled throughout Dark Ghettos, but one clear contrast that Shelby, and other egalitarian pluralists, aim to draw between integrationism and community-building pluralism regards directness and simplicity. Shelby criticises integration for being ‘a roundabout way to bring about economic justice’, in contrast to simply calling ‘on the government to tax the affluent for purposes of transferring income
and wealth to the poor'. More concretely, he defends, for example, ‘cash payments instead of food stamps and a more generous earned income tax credit . . . over housing vouchers’. In light of these and other scattered proposals, Ryerson infers that, ‘Shelby is asking for no less than an overhaul of our major political, economic and social institutions (roughly along the lines of those of a progressive Scandinavian country)’. So there we have it. Egalitarian pluralism calls for massive transfers of wealth, turning the United States into a socialist democracy. What could be simpler or more direct than that? (Why don’t we just do it already?)

Shelby is not, however, calling merely for improved redistributions to all the nation’s poor. We owe ghetto residents more targeted efforts. ‘[G]iven that blacks are already concentrated in metropolitan neighbourhoods’, Shelby asks, ‘why not simply attempt to create black communities that are not disadvantaged . . .? . . . To the extent possible and in a way that is fair to all affected, we should work to improve the residential environment of the unjustly disadvantaged’.

What does it mean to create black communities that are not disadvantaged, or, more modestly, to improve their residential environment? What is entailed by this proposal, and why think it’s more than a pipe dream? One searches in vain through Shelby’s references, and most of his references’ references, for clear real-world demonstrations of effective egalitarian-pluralist community development, let alone grounds for thinking that what worked in some specific context is plausibly scalable. One possible exception is Brooks’ proposal to model black community development on immigrant communities that have (relatively speaking) thrived despite high degrees of ethnic-spatial clustering and historical discrimination. However, this comparison (of blacks to ‘model’ minorities) is flawed in more ways than I can begin to adumbrate here. This is not to say that community-development initiatives have never been tried (they have), but that the results of these efforts, or even the broad contours of what a genuinely pluralist experiment might look like, are entirely absent from Shelby’s treatment.

Now, a cursory reading of integrationist literature would give one the impression that the empirical case against community-development initiatives was settled, but the evidence grounding their pessimism is elusive. Anderson writes that the ‘record of failed state-sponsored economic development projects in such areas is legion’, but evidently these failures are too obvious and well-known to warrant a citation. Poama, following Fiss, attempts to justify his pessimism about community development with empirical evidence, but his references either do not actually argue against community development, or they involve the kinds of pathologising policies and practices against which Shelby objects, such as food stamps, welfare-to-demeaning-work programs, and failures to include community members as decision-making partners. Pluralists reject these conditional and disrespectful transfers on the same basis that they reject integrationism.

One can nevertheless muster evidence to cast doubt on strategies for ‘directly investing’ in impoverished communities. One well-designed trial of cash transfers in the US found virtually no benefits to families apart from the modestly improved income provided by the transfer itself. On a larger scale, the Obama administration’s investment of billions into failing schools had no measurable effects on graduation rates or test scores. Such results echo what Patterson took to be well-established by the 1990s: transforming underachieving schools through ‘simple’ and ‘direct’ investment doesn’t
work. What is the egalitarian pluralist response to such failures? If transforming schools is this hard, what about transforming the entire communities in which the schools are embedded? (And how can we be confident that even successful transformations would not generate problematic forms of gentrification, pushing out the intended-beneficiary community members?) The upshot, naturally, is that community-based redistributions are not so simple and direct after all. So if my insistence on rigorous experimentation into what works seems callous, I would respond that redirecting resources in ways that make us feel better about having discharged our duties, but that do not actually make conditions better, is at least as problematic.

We should of course not overreact to disappointing results by giving up on school reform or community development altogether. Just as with MTO, isolated failures, no matter how large-scale or well-funded, do not provide much generalisable information, because, again, these are complex experiments into naturalistic settings comprised of numerous decisions that could have gone differently. The diversified experimentalism of the empirical mindset directs us to explore a range of smaller-scale initiatives before replicating and scaling up those deemed most promising. Going forward, we will continue to learn more about better and worse ways to transfer resources to disadvantaged communities. A recent bright spot here includes a well-powered and plausibly scalable randomised controlled trial which found that restoring vacant blighted lots into green spaces significantly reduced violent crime and fear in disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods. Yet even if we grant that some community-development initiatives have promising effects on individuals’ safety, health, wealth, and education, at least one major question, at the level of basic social structures, remains to be addressed.

5. The Epistemology of Social Justice

While Shelby criticises others for avoiding ‘fundamental questions about the basic structure of society’, he systematically avoids fundamental questions of his own, namely, about the basic epistemic structure of society. Shelby’s critical analysis of integration is organised almost entirely around its prospects for reducing prejudice and increasing blacks’ access to resources. He either aprioristically dismisses or entirely ignores the epistemic functions that integration might serve. But no assessment of integration is complete without considering its potential for producing and sharing knowledge. I should also reiterate that, although my focus is on Shelby, my intention is to highlight general epistemic challenges that face anyone who asserts that active integrationist efforts are not necessary for advancing racial justice.

Granted, Shelby does consider two of integration’s putative epistemic benefits, first, for increasing blacks’ knowledge how to navigate white spaces and, second, for increasing blacks’ knowledge of job opportunities. He downplays the normative importance of the first benefit (rightly in my view) with the now-familiar argument that it is unjust to make fluency in white customs a necessary condition for accessing basic goods and opportunities. He summarily dismisses the second benefit on the grounds that information about jobs can be obtained via other means, such as the internet. It is an open question how seriously to take Shelby’s dismissal here, grounded as it is in his intuitive appraisal of information accessibility (he seems, for example, to disregard the increasingly formidable challenge of reliably sifting nuggets of useful information.
from the swaths of online and telemarketing misinformation, scams, and predatory job offers). But I set that question aside because, as far as I can tell, Shelby nowhere engages with what I had taken to be the core epistemic value of integration, which had comparatively less to do with how well the downtrodden know the ways of the privileged than with the other way around.

It is a point of emphasis for Anderson that segregation prevents whites from knowing about the injustices that many blacks endure. This ignorance contributes to anti-black racism by encouraging whites to attribute hardships in the ghetto to irresponsible choices and cultural pathologies, rather than to ongoing discrimination and structural unfairness. Since most whites lack a front-row seat to ghetto conditions, it is too easy for them to think existing schemes of distribution are either already fair or even unfairly stacked in favour of the ghetto poor, making targeted redistributions to them not just unnecessary but downright unjust. Integrationists thus argue that downgraded agency and status quo bias arise from social conditions like racial and socioeconomic segregation, together with various facets of intergroup psychology, such as ingroup favouritism (i.e. rather than from the empirical mindset). Moreover, many whites are only aware of the situations of the ghetto poor via biased media sources, distorted pop-cultural portrayals, and race-baiting politicians. Because whites tend mostly to live, learn, and work with other whites, these distorted representations of other social groups often go unchallenged in lived experience.

Historically speaking, such epistemic obstacles have not been entirely insuperable. The Civil Rights Movement, which sought among other things to end Jim Crow segregation, famously benefited from widely televised broadcasts of police brutality in reaction to peaceful political expression. Yet the power of audio-visual documentation to cut through ideology may not be what it once was (if it ever was). Partisan media outlets and ‘tribal’ psychology are so effective at shaping interpretation that two people can look at the very same video, e.g. of a police officer using force on a black citizen, and have completely different reactions to it, such that (what I would have thought was) indisputable video evidence of brutality and malfeasance repeatedly fails to generate convictions. What’s more, we may be fast approaching an era when fake videos that are nearly indistinguishable from ‘the real thing’ can be fabricated out of whole digital cloth.

As technological developments increasingly silo groups off from one another and distort their mutual impressions, face-to-face contact may become that much more important for facilitating the transmission of knowledge about the injustice of ghetto conditions, as well as for bringing about and maintaining the structural-political changes and redistributive schemes that Shelby deems just. Interpersonal interaction across group boundaries is, on Anderson’s view, a precondition for fair, democratic decision-making. So although Shelby is correct that the empirical case for, and historical record surrounding, integration is far more complex and even troubling than Anderson lets on, the foregoing considerations suggest that at least some proactive steps toward integration may nevertheless be needed. I must flag, however, that this all remains speculative. Whether and how much integration advances these epistemic aims, and whether it is unique among candidate racial-justice initiatives in doing so, are empirical questions not to be settled from the armchair. For what it’s worth, the existing evidence seems unequivocally to suggest that integration helps specifically with the crucial aim of getting privileged white
people on board for social justice and collective action, and increasing their support for expanding resources and opportunities for blacks and other disadvantaged groups. Patterson claimed that the evidence for this was already ‘overwhelming’ two decades ago, and subsequent research has, with a few inevitable complications, increasingly confirmed it.

What is the pluralists’ alternative proposal for bridging these epistemic divides? How can we organise the basic epistemic structures of society to set up more reliable informational channels across groups? Despite Shelby’s insistence that we train our focus on society’s basic structures, he is more or less silent on these questions.

One suggestion, made in passing, is that we will need to ‘build and sustain a … social movement’ to overcome the ‘currently strong resistance to such reform’. Shelby is particularly concerned in this passage about the most just ways to recruit the ghetto poor into such a movement, but I have suggested that the operative epistemic obstacles also block the entry of those outside the ghetto into the movement. It is not obvious how, under conditions of segregation and misinformational mass media, a sufficient number of whites will even come to see social-movement protests for what they are. America’s segregationist racial hierarchy, and its symbolic ‘racial bribes’ to low-status whites, were arguably designed to undermine interracial coalitions among the poor and working class. Instead of perceiving demonstrations in the name of black lives as claims of justice, people honestly believe that protesters are terrorists. The social ‘disease’ we must ‘cure’ is, in other words, white ignorance and racism. If a movement is necessary (and of course, it is), a prior set of (partly empirical) questions ought to be raised about how to promote and facilitate that movement, and it may be that some proactive steps toward integration and face-to-face intergroup interaction will be integral to it. But Shelby seems to have an alternative view of how to model productive intergroup interaction.

6. The Moral Conversation Model and the Racialisation of Reasoning

One central feature of Shelby’s alternative to the medical model is a commitment to public moral conversation. Shelby expresses ‘the firm belief that careful philosophical reflection can assist in moving the public debate over black urban poverty in a more productive direction.’ According to this more productive discussion:

questions of justice should not be avoided, downplayed, or ignored, as many of the sharp political clashes over ghetto poverty turn… on disagreements over values, not facts. Justice questions should therefore be a focal point of public policy, political activism, and civic discourse concerning the future of our cities and their most disadvantaged inhabitants.

Because Shelby’s distinctive take on the primacy of normative dialogue most differentiates him from the empirical mindset, and from Anderson’s species of integrationism, I’ll refer to his view as the moral conversation model. And although moral conversation has numerous vital roles to play in understanding and correcting injustice, Shelby’s account of its roles is wanting. Segregation undermines productive, public moral dialogue just as it undermines the flow of knowledge.
Shelby asserts that the operative disagreements are over values rather than facts. This contrast is mistaken twice over. One of Shelby’s arguments can roughly be reconstructed as follows:

P1. All Americans deserve the same basic rights and opportunities.

P2. The ghetto poor are not receiving the same basic rights and opportunities as other Americans.

C. Therefore, the ghetto poor are not receiving what they deserve.

But public dialogue has clearly been centred on what Shelby calls the ‘factual claim’ in this argument (P2), rather than any ‘normative premises’. Majorities of Americans have endorsed some of the most relevant, abstract normative premises for decades. Disagreement persists over facts and practical implications. Many whites, for example, think that anti-white discrimination is more pervasive and serious than anti-black discrimination.

Yet the very idea of hiving off facts from values here is a mistake. Causally (if not logically) speaking, the two are connected, and both are thoroughly influenced by race. That is, moral and factual reasoning are racialised. Perceptions of what we owe each other are shaped through and through by racial and other biases. Racial attitudes have long predicted voting and party affiliation (including for Obama and Trump). Studies find that white people often become more supportive of, e.g., mass incarceration and the death penalty when they learn about their systemic racial disparities – partly because most whites report not personally experiencing or witnessing unfair police treatment, that is, because they do not directly, intimately understand what ghetto residents go through. Learning in the abstract about the facts of ghetto conditions could just as easily undercut as bolster white support for resource redistribution.

Shelby knows, of course, that the prospects for productive intergroup dialogue in unstructured contexts (e.g. outside of classrooms) are dim. This point figures in his argument against integration. He cites some of the extensive evidence of blacks and whites’ political differences in order to help explain why many blacks are reasonable to prefer living in predominantly black spaces, around politically likeminded people. Yet Shelby seems not to consider the full ramifications of such facts, and the extent to which they undermine his call for a productive moral conversation. Pluralists minimally owe us some plausible story about how these obstacles might be mitigated short of proactive steps toward integration.

What is particularly frustrating, however, is how unclear it is that Shelby is even engaging in the productive moral conversation he urges us to have. Some of his central concerns (e.g. against paternalism and conditional resource transfers) regard normative constraints on the pursuit of justice. He may be right that integrationists have wrongly downplayed their significance. Yet integrationists share many of Shelby’s core normative (and factual) views. They ask why these views are not shared by everyone else, and how we can better foster mutual understanding across group boundaries. Integration aims to help here. For Shelby to ignore this point is to persist in talking past his interlocutors. There are, in fact, other fundamental normative questions besides those of particular concern to him. Many integrationists foreground the claim that integration is a precondition for just democratic decision-making. That is, they’d
argue that, if Shelby is right that above all we need to prioritise a conversation about what we owe each other, there are still prior questions about how to promote that very conversation. If Shelby wanted to debate integrationists about fundamental justice, then the relevance of integration to democracy would warrant a mention. The most Shelby does on this score is flag that he is not going to ‘engage’ Anderson’s ‘controversial theory of democracy’.76

Is Shelby’s plea for more reasoned normative dialogue itself a piece of liberal, status-quo-stabilising ideology? I would rather abstain from the reverberating accusations about who’s questioning basic structures and who’s reinforcing them. I am not opposed to public dialogue, but Shelby’s call for more of it is, in this context, a non sequitur.

7. Because Racism: The Necessity of Prejudice Reduction

Shelby’s approach, like Anderson’s, is insufficiently holistic. On the one hand, he takes white prejudice and opposition to ghetto-directed redistributions as givens, cited to explain the reasonability of some blacks’ aversion to white spaces. On the other hand, Shelby recognises that racial justice will not be achieved without some diminution of prejudice. Yet he says little about what causes prejudice, or its diminution. That prejudice is part of the problem and that reducing it is part of the solution function as uncaused causes in his account, floating in mid-air. The closest he comes to weighing in on these points is to suggest that, ‘an integrationist ethos – a pervasive sense of interracial unity – would be a natural by-product of a just multiracial society of equals … interracial unity would likely be a consequence of a just social structure and the manifest willingness of the citizenry to support and maintain it because it is just’.77

Now, if Shelby is predicting that a more just, social-democratic (Scandinavian) regime would all by itself promote racial harmony, he is likely mistaken. The redistributionist fervour in social-democratic European nations has derived in no small part from their ethnic homogeneity (i.e. the absence of major ethnic-racial tensions), and as these countries become more diverse, support for redistribution erodes while support for far-right reactionaries increases.78 Once an ‘other’ enters the political scene, so too do resentments about unfair handouts, losses of jobs, and national-cultural traditions. Little evidence suggests that greater social-economic fairness just as such inspires racial harmony.79

Nevertheless, such facts as the racialisation of normative thought and its interplay with broader structural conditions like segregation do not immediately speak in favour of integration over pluralism or community development. Prejudice and segregation impede just about every racial-justice initiative we can think of, including even universalistic colour-blind efforts, like basic income and healthcare, and reaffirmations of basic rights (e.g. rights against unwarranted search and seizure, which many blacks are routinely denied). And integrationists’ response to the appearance of anti-black prejudice as an obstacle at every turn is almost as unsatisfactory as pluralists’. Anderson writes that ‘the work of integration inevitably rests with the spontaneous actions of citizens in civil society’.80 But segregation and prejudice will, according to her own theory, prevent such actions from spontaneously combusting on a difference-making scale. This allows Shelby to respond to the
objection that his vision is unfeasible by pointing out that Anderson’s is unfeasible, too.\textsuperscript{81} As if theirs are the only two options, and the bleak prospects of one somehow vindicate the other.

Perhaps ironically, given the back-and-forth bluster about distracting attention from basic structures and injustices, we must return to individual psychology and ethics. Whichever structural reforms we prioritise, changing individuals’ racial attitudes will likely be integral to bringing them about. Reducing prejudice will be necessary for enabling productive moral conversation, fair resource redistribution, ghetto revitalisation, and the integration of neighbourhoods, schools, and jobs. There is, in other words, no way out of racial injustice but through prejudice reduction.\textsuperscript{82}

\textit{Alex Madva, Department of Philosophy, California State Polytechnic University, 3801W. Temple Blvd, Pomona, CA 91768, USA. alexmadva@gmail.com}

\textbf{NOTES}


5 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 278.


7 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 2.

8 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 2. Shelby counts as a third drawback that the medical model prevents the recognition of unjust privilege, but this third drawback is subsumed by the first, status quo bias.

9 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 293, nn.29, 33.

10 Anderson 2010 op. cit., chap. 6.

© Society for Applied Philosophy, 2019
11 Shelby 2007 op. cit.
12 Cashin op. cit., pp. 322–4; see also pp. 310–2. Patterson also endorses housing vouchers in one paragraph and increased investment in ghetto schools in the next, despite his empirically-informed pessimism about the prospects for meaningfully improving schools this way, op. cit. pp. 190–1.
14 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 163.
15 A Journal of Applied Philosophy referee asked for examples. For starters, the 19th-century ‘father’ of black nationalism, Martin R. Delany, was overtly elitist and even settler colonialist, arguing that black elites should emigrate to Africa to civilise the Africans. See Nell Irvin Painter, ‘Martin R. Delany: Elitism and Black Nationalism’ in L.F. Litwack & A. Meier (eds) Black Leaders of the Nineteenth Century (Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1991), pp. 149–71. But for further references and extensive discussion of the (past and present, empirical and normative) challenges that elitism and classism have posed to black political solidarity, and for generous reconstructions of the evident elitism in several major historical figures, including Delany, see Shelby 2007 op. cit. Among early nationalists, Shelby cites Marcus Garvey as anti-elitist, but even he wrote in 1915 that most black Jamaicans ‘are really unfit for good society. To the cultured mind the bulk of our people are contemptible – that is to say, they are entirely outside the pale of cultured appreciation’, in Robert A. Hill, Marcus Garvey & Universal Negro Improvement Association, The Marcus Garvey and Universal Negro Improvement Association Papers, Vol. I: 1826-August 1919 (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1983), p. 134. The emphasis on ‘racial self-help’ and ‘personal responsibility’ in the conservative black nationalist tradition persists in the Nation of Islam, and goes back at least to Booker T. Washington, whom W.E.B. Du Bois famously criticised for advocating acquiescence to 19th-century segregation and putting the onus on blacks to focus on helping themselves by acquiring basic industrial skills. In response, the ‘cultural pluralist’ Du Bois’ defence of higher educational and sociopolitical aims was itself notoriously elitist. For example, he chided the founders of early black universities for expanding their educational reach too broadly, thereby ‘forgetting ... the rule of inequality: – that of the million black youth, some were fitted to know and some to dig’, in W.E.B. Du Bois, ‘The Souls of Black Folk’ W.E.B. Du Bois: Writings: The Suppression of the African Slave-Trade/The Souls of Black Folk/Dusk of Dawn/Essays and Articles (New York: Library of America, 1987), pp. 357–547, at p. 421. More consistently anti-elitist forms of black nationalism became prominent in the 1960s, defended by figures including Malcolm X and Kwame Ture (Stokely Carmichael).
18 Patterson op. cit., pp. 32–8. In addition to claiming that ‘the most important case for school integration’ is to teach blacks how to assimilate into white spaces at p. 191, Patterson claims that black youth are too preoccupied with sports, that male students who impregnate female students should be prohibited from varsity sports and, after the second impregnation, expelled, at p. 188; that the ‘only Hispanics who should qualify for affirmative action are Puerto Ricans ... and Mexicans’, at p. 193; and that it is ‘time for Afro-American women to expand their options by widening the network of men whom they are prepared to marry’, at p. 197.
21 Anderson 2010 op. cit., sec.1.2.
22 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 75.
23 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 121.
24 Thanks to Katie Gasdaglis for insightful discussion about how to understand and label this second interpretation of Shelby’s arguments. In fact, it would be surprising if Shelby intended to rest his case against the medical model on the basis of its contingent, historical (ad hoc?) associations with status quo bias, because relevantly similar appeals to problematic historical associations have been used to criticise black nationalism (e.g. as intrinsically patriarchal), and ideal political theory more generally, and Shelby attempts to rebut these criticisms much as I do here, e.g., by arguing that ideal theory is not ‘inherently ideological’. See Tommie Shelby, ‘Racial realities and corrective justice: A reply to Charles Mills’, Critical Philosophy of Race 1,2 (2013): 145–62, at p. 145, emphasis added.
25 See note 15.


32 Goetz op. cit., pp. 41–2.

33 See also Cruse op. cit.; Bell op. cit.

34 For references, see Goetz op. cit., pp. 39–41.

35 Anderson 2010 op. cit., p. 219, n.11, and sec.9.3.

36 I should note that I do not intend to conflate political feasibility with the requirements of justice. I am here responding to Anderson’s specific claim that integration is the most *empirically* defensible strategy. If integration subjects people of colour to further discrimination, that fact is (and these are two separate points) both a consideration against its normative legitimacy and a consideration against its empirical efficacy and political feasibility. Thanks to a *Journal of Applied Philosophy* referee for pushing me to clarify this.


43 Andrei Poama, ‘Staying in or moving out? Justice and the abolition of the dark ghetto’, *European Journal of Political Theory* (2017): https://doi.org/10.1080/1474885117730674, at pp. 6–9. In particular, Poama gives a compelling argument that pluralist activism is also likely to incur compromises with injustice.

44 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 77.

45 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 73.

46 For example, Young op. cit., p. 227.

47 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 69.

48 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 78. In the ellipsis, Shelby writes that the tax credit should be ‘distributed biweekly or monthly rather than annually’. Why is this not a paternalistic restriction of ghetto agency, in contrast to lump sum payment? While often trumpeting ‘the maximization of choice of disadvantaged groups’, e.g.
at Goetz op. cit., p. 54, pluralists’ substantive proposals are replete with choice restrictions, and they tend not to offer principled accounts of which choices are permissibly restricted. (Goetz defends subsidised housing, but why not just give people the cash equivalent of the subsidy?)


50 Shelby 2016 op. cit., pp. 74, 68.

51 Brooks op. cit., pp. 244–6, 258–63.


53 For concrete strategies for community economic development, which I found through one of Shelby’s references, and which I believe warrant (as-yet-undone) rigorous experimental investigation, see Michael J. Bennett & Robert P. Giloth, Economic Development in American Cities: The Pursuit of an Equity Agenda (Ithaca, NY: SUNY Press, 2012). I discuss a few specific examples of community development in the next two paragraphs.

54 Anderson 2018 op. cit., p. 283.


56 ‘Disappointing findings on Conditional Cash Transfers as a tool to break the poverty cycle in the United States | Straight Talk on Evidence’, <http://www.straighttalkonevidence.org/2017/09/22/disappointing-findings-on-conditional-cash-transfers-as-a-tool-to-break-the-poverty-cycle-in-the-united-states/>. There is a large, mushrooming literature on cash-transfer programs, however; the jury on them remains out. Thanks to Lin Ong for helping me navigate this literature.


60 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 278.

61 Epistemic defences can also be given for black self-segregation, e.g. its potential to help black communities build and enrich their own ways of knowing. Integrationists counter that there are ways of cultivating such knowledge, through cultural centres, clubs, etc., short of full-blown residential or educational segregation. See Amie A. Macdonald, ‘Racial authenticity and white separatism’ in P.M.L. Moya & M.R. Hames-Garcia (eds) Reclaiming Identity: Realist Theory and the Predicament of Postmodernism (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 205–25; Anderson 2010 op. cit., sec.9.2.

62 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 293, n.28.

63 On the epistemic-democratic operations of the Civil Rights movement, see, e.g., Anderson 2010 op. cit., secs5.2-3.

64 Patterson op. cit., p. 191.

65 For further discussion and a range of references about both the confirmations and the complications, see Ryan D Enos, The Space between Us: Social Geography and Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017) <https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108354943> [accessed 2 May 2018]; Madva 2016 op. cit.; Madva 2017 op. cit.; Pettigrew op. cit.

66 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 113.


68 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 15.

69 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 4.

70 On the limits of moral reasoning and dialogue, see Elizabeth Anderson, Social Movements, Experiments in Living, and Moral Progress: Case Studies from Britain’s Abolition of Slavery Lindley Lecture (Lawrence, KS:

71 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 113.


73 For a qualitative survey, see German Lopez, ‘The past year of research has made it very clear: Trump won because of racial resentment’ *Vox*, 2017 <https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/12/15/16781222/trump-racism-economic-anxiety-study>.


76 Shelby 2014 ‘Integration, inequality, and imperatives of justice’ op. cit., p. 254 and n.4. See also Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 284.

77 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 79.

78 For discussion and references, see Zack Beuchamp, ‘No easy answers: Why left-wing economics is not the answer to right-wing populism’ *Vox*, 2017 <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/13/14698812/bernie-trump-corbyn-left-wing-populism>.

79 Madva 2016 op. cit., sec.3.

80 Anderson 2010 op. cit., p. 189.

81 Shelby 2016 op. cit., p. 74.

82 This article benefited greatly from feedback from Erin Beegly, Jules Holroyd, and two *Journal of Applied Philosophy* referees; from numerous insightful conversations with Katie Gasdaglis; and from thought-provoking discussions of related topics with Cory Aragon, Aaron DeRosa, and Matthew Walters in a reading group on works by leading black American historical figures.